

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 IO-03 PM-03 L-02 CIAE-00 INR-10

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2096

DIA WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USCINCEUR

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BEIRUT 5437

LIMDIS

DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO

E. O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PINS, LE

SUBJ: SITUATION IN LEBANON

BEGIN SUMMARY: SITUATION HERE IS AS WE HAVE REPORTED
FLUID AND CONFUSED. NEVERTHELESS WE THING OVERALL ASSESS-
MENT OF PRESENT AND PAST AS BEST WE CAN MAKE IT, IT OUT, WILL BE
USEFUL IN CONSIDERING FUTURE IMPLICATION OF LEBANESE CRISIS.
DESPITE CONTINUED CALM AND PROGRESSIVE RETURN TO NORMALCY,
OUR ASSESSMENT OF LONGER- TERM POLITICO- MILITARY SITUATION IS NOT
RPT NOT GOOD ALTHOUGH IT COULD IMPROVE SHOULD CERTAIN
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FACTORS EVOLVE IN FAVOR OF GOL. REPORTS WE RECEIVE FROM PRESI-
DENCY INDICATE CONTINUED OPTISISM AND DETERMINATION IMPROVE
CONSIDERABLY ON BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN
WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO BEIRUT RAID. HOWEVER, PRECISE IDEAS

ON HOW TO GET THERE ARE JUST BEGINNING TO EMERGE AND IT MAY BE THAT GOL WILL FIND IT LACKS POLITICAL AND MILITARY FORCE REQUIRED ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE. INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION HAS BEEN RELATIVELY GOOD AND CONFESSIONAL SPLIT HAS NOT OCCURRED ALTHOUGH THIS MATTER OR DEEP AND CONTINUING CONCERN. HOWEVER SUNNI MOSLEM LEADERS THUS FAR UNWILLING ACTUALLY SUPPORT FRANGIE IN IMPOSING CONTROL ON FEDAYEEN AND MOSLEM QUARTERS OF MAJOR CITIES OFFER POTENTIAL REFUGE AS WELL AS SOME SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN. ECONOMIC DAMAGE AND DISCOMFORT SUFFERED FOR CONTINUATION SEEMS BE GENERATING POPULAR PRESSURE FOR CONTINUATION OF CALM EVEN IF NO CONCESSIONS MADE BY FEDAYEEN. MUCH OF ARMY'S FIGHTING FORCE TIED UP IN MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER BEIRUT, ALTHOUGH ARMY HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS FIGHTING ABILITY, COHESION AND COURAGE AND HAS HURT FEDAYEEN IN SOME AREAS. FEDAYEEN HAVE QUIETED DOWN AND ARE NEGOTIATING WITH ARMY. HOWEVER, THEY ARE IN POSITION RELATIVE STRENGTH BECAUSE THEIR COMBINED REGULAR AND MILITIA COMBAT ELEMENTS MORE NUMEROUS THAN ARMY COMBAT TROOPS AND ARE STRATEGICALLY LOCATED IN BIG CITIES AS WELL AS IN COUNTRYSIDE, WHILE THREAT OF SYRIAN ACTION CONTINUES HANG HEAVY OVER HEAD OF LEBANESE. ARAB REACTION HAS BEEN MIXED BUT EVEN MOST HELPFUL ARAB STATES (EGYPT AND KUWAIT) ARE AIMING FOR CEASE- FIRE ALONG LINES STATUS QUO RATHER THAN STRONGER GOL POSITION. THERE IS NO VISIBLE SOURCE OF STRONG EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR FRANGIE. SUM OF ABOVE FACTORS INDICATES LIKELIHOOD OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WILL BRING ONLY LIMITED IMPROVEMENT IN GOL- FEDAYEEN RELATIONSHIP BUT WHICH WILL LEAVE BEHIND CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO LEBANESE ECONOMY, SOME DAMAGE TO STRENGTH OF GOVERNMENT (I. E., FRANGIE) AND MORALE OF ARMY, AND SEEDS OF ANOTHER EXPLOSION LATER ON. LESS LIKELY COMBINATION OF REDUCED SYRIAN THREAT, RALLYING OF STRONGER INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR FRANGIE'S POSITION, AND ALL- OUT ACTION BY ARMY COULD PRODUCE MORE FAVORABLE LONG- TERM OUTCOME. END SUMMARY.

1. REPORTS FROM PRESIDENCY (DIB, TONY FRANGIE, FONMIN
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ABOU HAMAD) AND FOREIGN OFFICE (SADDQA) INDICATE THAT PRES FRANGIE REMAINS DETERMINED TRY ENFORCE GOL CONTROL (SOVERENTY) OVER FEDAYEEN TO MUCH GREATER DEGREE THAN SINCE 1969. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT PRECISE IDEAS ON SHAPE OF NEW OVERALL UNDERSTANDING WITH FEDAYEEN AND HOW TO ARRIVE AT ONE ARE JUST BEGINNING TO BE WORKED OUT (SEE SEPTTEL). WE UNDER- STAND FRANGIE INSISTING UPON MINIMUM OF QUASI- DEMILITARIZATION OF CAMPS IN BEIRUT AREA AND HAVING FEDAYEEN ANSWER TO LEBANESE JUSTICE FOR CIVIL OFFENSES. FRANGIE IS USING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND CONSULTATIONS WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN EFFORT BOLSTER POPULAR AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR HIS POSITION. MIXED ARMY- FEDAYEEN COMMISSION MEETING REGULARLY BUT ITS TALKS

CONFINED TO SPECIFICS OF MAINTANING CEASE- FIRE RATHER THAN WORK ON OVERALL SETTLEMENT. ARMY IS AT LEAST AS DETERMINED AS FRANGIE TO IMPOSED CONTROLS ON FEDAYEENRR. HOWEVER IT NOT CLEAR WHAT WILL EMERGE, ESPECIALLY SINCE GOL- FEDAYEEN NEGOTIATIONS ARE INEVITABLY INFLUENCED BY INTERNAL POLITICO- ECONOMIC SITUATIN AND BY EXTERNAL FACTORS SUCH AS ATTITUDE AND ACTIONS OF ARAB STATES AND MAJOR POWERS.

2. INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IS, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGING IN THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO OPEN SPLIT OF LEBANESE POPULATION ALONG CONFESSIONAL LINES AND SUNNI MOSLEM LEADERS ARE GENERALLY MODERATE RATHER THAN EXTREMIST IN THEIR ATTITUDES. FORMER PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAM HAS BEEN HELPFUL TO FRANGIE AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER RACHID KARAME HAS BEEN NOT AS BAD AS HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN, ALTERNATING ANTI- GOL POSTURING (E. G., URGING HAVEZ TO RESIGN AS PRIME MINISTER) WITH EFFORTS CALM SUNNI MOSLEMS AND PREVENT OPEN SPLIT. HOWEVER, NONE OF SUNNI MOSLEM LEADERS HAS COME OUT CLEARLY IN SUPPORT OF FRANGIE' S POSITION RE NEED TO IMPOSE GREATER GOL CONTROL ON FEDAYEEN, INCLUDING CAMPS. AND WHILE MOSLEM GUARTERS OF BEIRUT, TRIPOLI, SIDON AND TYRE HAVE GENERALLY REMAINED CALM, ARMS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO POTENTIALLY PRO- FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS IN ALL THESE CITIES; AND IN LARGE PARTS OF SIDON AND TYRE FEDAYEEN AND THEIR SUNNI AND LEFTIST LEBANESE SUPPORTERS HAVE HELD DE FACTO CONTROL WITH ARMY AND POLICE STEERING CLEAR. ABSENCE OF SUNNI
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MOSLEM PRIME MINISTER IS BOTH INDICATIVE OF ABSENCE IMPORTANT SUNNI MOSLEM SUPPORT AND ONE OF RESSONS FOR IT.

NOTE BY OC/ T: NOT PASSED CAIRO

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-10 ADP-00 IO-03 PM-03 L-02 CIAE-00 INR-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2097

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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LACK OF SUCH SUPPORT OBVIOUSLY HAS SOME INHIBITING EFFECT ON PRES FRANGIE AND ARMY WHO FEAR THAT PRESSING FEDAYEEN TOO HARD COULD PROVOKE CONFENSIONAL SPLIT AND CIVIL STRIFE. IT ALSO ENCOURAGES FEDAYEEN TO HOLD OUT FOR BETTER TERMS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOL. (WE HAVE RELIABLE REPORTS THAT AT ONE TIME DURING HEAT OF FIGHTING 'ARAFAT THREATENED SAEB SALAM WITH MOVING FEDAYEEN IN BEIRUT AREA FROM CAMPS INTO MOSLEM QUARTER AND MAKING STAND THERE IN INDIVIDUAL HOMES. THIS IS WITHIN CAPABILITY OF FEDAYEEN, AND IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT SUNNIS OF BEIRUT OR OTHER CITIES WOULD OFFER ANY RESISTANCE EVEN THROUGH ONLY MINORITY OF THEM COULD BE EXPECTED ACTUALLY TAKE UP ARMS. LEBANESE ARMY WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE PROBLEMS OF GETTING FEDAYEEN OUT.) THERE ARE SOME POLITICAL FIGURES (AS WELL AS PRESIDENT) WORKING TO RALLY ACTIVE SUNNI MOSLEM SUPPORT FOR FRANGIE'S POSITION BUT IT HAS NOT YET APPEARED. ON
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OTHER HAND, CHRISTIAN POPULATION CLEARLY IN SOLID SUPPORT OF GOL AS ONE WOULD EXPECT. PHALANGE HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS IN SOME SECTORS AND SAME IN SOME INTERIOR REGIONS AND VILLAGES. SAHIA MOSLEM LEADERS ARE ALSO SUPPORTING FRANGIE POSITION.

3. ECONOMIC SITUATION IS BEGINNING TO BITE (EMYEL 5413). LOSS OF REVENUE TO INDIVIDUALS DUE TO NON- WORK AND CURFEW PLUS ABSENCE OF SOME FOODSTUFFS AND OTHER GOODS DUE TO PORT CLOSURE IS ALREADY HURTING, AS IN LOSS OF BUSINESS AND PROFITS TO LEBANON'S POWERFUL BUSINESS COMMUNITY. LOSS OF REVENUE TO GOL (DIMINISHED TAXES AND DUTIES) AND TO COUNTRY GENERALLY DUE TO LONGER- TERM FALL- OFF OF BUSINESS AND TOURISM IS ANOTHER CONSIDERATION, AS IS PERSONAL DISCOMFORT FROM CURFEW AND, IN SOME CASES, FROM ACTUAL BATTLE DAMAGE. GIVEN LEBANESE MENTALITY, THESE FACTORS CANNOT HELP BUT GENERATE PRESSURE FOR EARLY SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN ON ALMOST ANY TERMS SO LONG AS CALM AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY ARE RESTORED SOON-- IRRESPECTIVE OF LONGER- TERM PROBLEMS WHICH REMAINS UNRESOLVED. RETURN TO BUSINESS- AS- USUAL CAN TAKE PLACE WITHOUT SETTLING

FEDAYEEN PROBLEM, BUT IT WILL MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR ARMY TO CONTROL MOVEMENT OF FEDAYEEN, RESUPPLY OF CAMPS, ETC., AND COULD ALSO MAKE GOL MORE APPREHENSIVE OF RISKING ANOTHER SHOW- DOWN WITH FEDAYEEN FOR FEAR OF ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION.

4. OUR OVERALL ESTIMATE OF ARMY' S PERFORMANCE TO DATE IS GOOD -- BETTER EVEN THAN EXPECTED IN SUCH FILED AS AIR OPERATIONS, USE OF ARMOR AND INFANTRY IN CERTAIN TACTICAL OPERATION SUCH AS ATTACK ON OUTSKIRTS SABRA CAMP MAY 8, AND USE OF ARTILLERY IN BEIRUT AREA AND SOUTH BEKAA/ ARKUB. HOWEVER, ARMY IS NOT OPERATING ON BASIS OF ANY OPERATION PLAN NOR ANY AGREED STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR MASTERING FEDAYEEN, AND IT HAS BEEN HELD IN TIGHT CONTROL BY PRESIDENT FRANGIE WHO HAS THUS FAR NOT ORDERED ARMY TO TRY AND OVERTAKE CAMPS BY FORCE, PROBABLY BECAUSE HE BELIEVES FEDAYEEN WILL EVENTUALLY CONSEDE MINIMAL DEMANDS WITHOUT SUCH DRASTIC MOVE AND/ OR BECAUSE HE FEARS THAT DIRECT ATTACK ON CAMPS COULD PROVOKE FUULL- SCALE CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, CONFESSIONAL SPLIT, AND INCREASED SYRIAN INTERVENTION. ALSO, AS REPORTED, ARMY SHELLING AND BOMBING OF CAMPS AREAS HAS
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BEEN HELD TO MINUM AND DIRECTED AT SPECIFIC TARGETS AND AVOIDANCE OF POPULATED AREAS. LIMITED ACTION BY ARMY HAS SUCCEEDED IN AVOIDING NATION- WIDE CLAS WITH FEDAYEEN AND HAS CONFINED FIGHT WITH FEDAYEEN IN BEIRUT MOSTLY TO AREAS IN AND IMMEDIATELY AROUND CAMPS RATHER THAN HAVING IT DEGENERATE INTO FULL- SCALE URBAN GUERILLA ACTION. BEIRUT HAS BEEN BROUGH UNDER CONTROL AND FEDAYEEN EFFECTIVELY CONFINED TO CAMPS BUT AT COST FO FREEZING LARGE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ARMY COMBAT UNITS IN BEIRUT AREA AND ALLOWING FEDAYEEN FUTHER FORTIFY CAMPS. THE ARMY HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO BRING ABOUT HALF OF ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH INTO BEIRUT, DENUING THAT SECTION OF COUNTRY TO A POINT WHERE FEDAYEEN MAY SOON ENJOY GREATER MOBILITY AND FREEDOM OF ACTION (ON THE LEBANESE SIDE) THAN FOR MANY MONTHS. THE ARMY HAS ALSO BEEN OBLIGED TO " FREEZE" A NUMBER OF TROOPS IN BORDER AREAS FAR FROM THE MAJOR CITIES IN ORDER TO TRY AND PREVENT TROOP INFILTRATION FROM SYRIA AND MOVEMENT OF ARMS AND MEN FROM REMOTE AREAS INTO THE MAJOR CITIES AND REFUGEE CAMPS. ARMY HAS BEEN PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL ON BOTH COUNTS BUT ADDITIONAL FEDAYEEN HAVE MOVED FROM SYRIA INTO REMOTE AREAS OF LEBANON AND SOME ARMS HAVE REACHED THE MAJOR CITIES AND CAMPS. A MAJOR LIMITATION ON CAPABILITY OF ARMY IS THAT IT HAS MAXIMUM OF 6, 000 ACTUAL COMBAT TROOPS.

5. THE ESTIMATE OF FEDAYEEN STRENGH IN LEBANON WE HAVE BEEN USING FOR SOME TIME IS ABOUT 5,000 ARMED " REGULARS" PLUS PERHAPS ANOTHER 10,000 " MILITIA" (MOSTLY IN THE CAMPS). REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ONE TAKES ISRAELS OR LEBANESE ESTIMATE OF NUMBERS FEDAYEEN REGULARS WHO CROSSED INTO LEBBANON DURING PAST TEN DAYS (TEL AVIV DAO 686; BEIRUT 5269) THE NUMBER OF REGULARS HAS INCREASED. MOVEROVER, THERE ARE OTHER SIZEABLE REGULAR CAMPS

IN BEIRUT AREA HAVE PROVEN CORRECT PRIOR SUSPICIONS THAT THEY (AND MILITIA) ARE HEAVILY ARMED, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE ANDT- TANK ROCKETS, KATUSHA, HEAVY AND LIGHT MORTARS AND MACHINE GUNS. CAMPS ARE ALSO FORTIFIED TO VARYING DEGREES AGAINST ASSAULT. FEDAYEEN (REGULARS

AND MILITA) HAVE ALSO PROVEN THEY ABLE TO HOLD THEIR GROUND UNDER FIRE(ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECT ASSAULT) IN CAMPS. ALTHOUGH SOME OF CAMPS (AND FEDAYEEN IN THEM) SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE. DURING FIGHTING FEDAYEEN DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY FOR WIDE- SPREAD URBAN GUERILLA AND TERROR ACTION EVEN THOUGH IT WAS LIMITED IN PRATICE. SAME
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APPLIES FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION ACTION IN OTHER MAJOR CITIES (E. G., SIDON AND TYRE) AND IN COUNTRYSIDE (E. G., AMMBUSH BETWEEN SIDON AND TYRE) ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ONLY LIMITED ISTANCES OF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS OUTSIDE BEIRUT EXCEPT FOR ACTION IN SYRIAN BORDER AREAS. ONE FEDAYEEN WEAKNESS MAY BE SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION AFTER EXTENDED FIGHTING.

NOTE BY OC/ T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

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ACTION NEA-06

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R 121307 Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2098
DIA
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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LIMDIS

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6. SYRAIN ROLE, AS WE HAVE ALL BEEN AWARE FOR MANY YEARS, IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IN DETERMINING RELATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH OF FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE ARMY. OVER PAST TEN DAYS, APPARENTLY WITHOUT COMMITTING MORE THAN A COUPLE OF HUNDRED SAIQA (IF THAT) AND FEW IF ANY REGULAR UNITS, SYRIA WAS ABLE EFFECTIVELY FUEL FIGHTING ABILITY OF FEDAYEEN, HARASS ARMY INSTALLATIONS AND OUT-POSTS NEAR BORDER AREA (E. G., TWO MILITARY AIRFIELDLS), AND HOLD OVER GOL HEAD THREAT OF MORE MASSIVE INFILTRATION OF FEDAYEEN AND EVEN, SHOULD ALL- OUT FIGHT DEVELOP, SYRIAN REGULAR UNITS. THIS LATTER PROSPECT DISCOUNTED SOMEWHAT BY LEBANESE ARMY WHO COUNTING ON ISRAEL BUT NEITHER ARMY NOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE COULD
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ASSUME IT WOULD NOT HAPPEN SINCE THERE WERE NO HARD ASSURANCES AGAINST IT FROM ANY QUARTER AND THERE WERE SIGNALS FROM SYRIANS THAT IT MIGHT HAPPEN. MAIN POINT TO BEAR IN MIND, HOWEVER, IS THAT EVEN WITH COMMITTING REGULARSSYRIA HAS SHOWN CAPABILITY OF ADDING CONSIDERABLY TO MILITARY CAPABILITY OF FEDAYEEN. SYRIA ALSO HAS CAPABILITY OF ADDING TO POLITICAL THREAT POSED BY PRO- FEDAYEEN AND/ OR LEFTIST LEBANESE ELEMENTS BY ITS PROPAGANDA AND ITS POLITICAL AGITATION AMONG MAJOR CITIES. OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IS SYRIAN SMUGGLING OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION. JUDGING FROM WHAT WE KNOW HERE AND WHAT IDF HAS REPORTED VIA DAO TEL AVIV, SYRIANS SEEM HAVE PLENTY OF FEDAYEEN UNITS IN RESERVE SHOULD FIGHTING START UP AGAIN. FOR PRESENT, HOWEVER, THEY SEEM CONTENT TO AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS AND DISPLAY VISAGE OF SWEET REASONABLENESS.

7. ROLE OF OTHER ARAB STATES HAS, AS REPORTED FROM HERE AND OTHER POSTS, VARIED WIDELY. IRAQ AND ALGERIA WERE AT LEAST AS NASTY AS SYRIA IN TERMS OF PROPAGANDA, ALTHOUGH ALGERIANS WERE LESS PROVOCATIVE IN TERMS OF AMBASSADOR YAZID' S BEHAVIOUR ON THE GROUND. EGYPT AND MAHMOUD RIAD SO FAR APPEAR TO HAVE PLAYED USEFUL ROLE IN RESTRAINING SYRIANS AS DID KUWAIT. OTHER ARAB STATES WERE MORE OR LESS NEUTRAL. HOWEVER, WITH EXCEPTION JORDAN, NONE OF THEM, AS BEST WE CAN DETERMINE, HAVE BEEN WILLING TAKE STAND IN EITHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE BACKING FRANGIE' S DEMAND FOR TIGHTER CONTROLS OVER FEDAYEEN AND, AS FIGHTING CONTINUED, ARAB POSITION (INCLUDING EGYPT) VIS- A- VIS GOL TENDED WEAKEN.

8. ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS WAS NOT A MAJOR FACTOR ALTHOUGH FRANCE AND UNITED STATES PROVIDED SOME MORAL ENCOURAGEMENT TO FRANGIE WHILE USSR WAS DISCREETLY SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN. ROLE OF LATTER COULD BE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT IN THAT IT COULD HAVE PLAYED AND CAN STILL PLAY EFFECTIVE POSITIVE ROLE IN SUPPORTING FRANGIE VIS- A- VIS SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN BUT SO FAR CLEARLY DISINCLINED TO DO SO. FOR OBVIOUS POLITICAL REASONS GOL DID NOT ASK FOR DIRECT AID

FROM US OR FRENCH ALTHOUGH THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT IT WAS INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP DETER SYRIANS.

9. SOME TIME IN NEAR FUTURE, PROBABLY MATTER OF FEW WEEKS BUT POSSIBLY SOONER, SITUATION SUMMRIZED ABOVE WILL VERY LIKELY LEAD TO: (A) FEDAYEEN ACCEPTANCE (PROBABLY TACIT) OF FRANGIE' S MINIMAL DEMANDS; OR (B) FRANGIE WITHDRAWAL
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(PROBABLY TACIT) OF DEMANDS AND ACCEPTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH FEDAYEEN FAIRLY CLOSE TO STATUS QUO ANTE; OR (C) NEW CONFRONTATION BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND FRANGIE AND ARMY.

A. OPTION A) IT IS OUR PRESENT JUDGMENT THAT FEDAYEEN WILL NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT ANY REAL DEMILITARIZATION OF CAMPS, EVEN REMOVAL OF HEAVY ARMS WHICH SEEMS BE ROCK- BOTTOM MINIMUM DEMAND OF FRANGIE. (SALAH KHALAF TOLD ARMY REPS ON MIXED COMMISSION ON MAY 10 HE WOULD NEVER STAND FOR REPETITION OF WHAT HAPPENED TO FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN IN 1970 WHEN THEY DEMILITARIZED CAMPS. ARMY BELIEVES THIS ACCURATELY REFLECTS REAL POSITION OF FEDAYEEN. SO DO WE.) THEREFORE OPTION A) ABOVE SEEMS TO US UNLIKELY.

B. OPTION B) THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR FRANGIE SINCE HE IS PROUD MAN WHO HAS STAKED A LOT ON IMPOSING AT LEAST MINIMAL GOL SOVEREIGNTY OVER FEDAYEEN, INCLUDING CAMPS. MOREOVER, ARMY IS PRESSING HARD FOR AT LEAST THIS MUCH COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES THEY HAVE SUFFERED-- AND THIS MUCH INSURANCE AGAINST FURTHER ISRAELI INCURSIONS PROVOKED BY FEDAYEEN. SEVERAL SENIOR OFFICERS AND MANY JUNIOR OFFICERS REPORTEDLY UNHAPPY OVER RESTRAINTS PLACE ON ARMY OVER PAST TEN DAYS. SHOULD FRANGIE BE FORCED BACK DOWN IT COULD HURT MORALE OF ARMY AS WELL AS PRESTIGE OF PRESIDENT. ECONOMIC LOSSES WOULD BE FOR NOUGHT. MORE- OVER CONDITIONS WOULD EXIST FOR ANOTHER SERIOUS EXPLOSION AT SOME FUTURE DATE BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN, POSSIBLY AS RESULT OF ANOTHER ISRAELI RAID.

C. OPTION C) THIS IS UP TO FRANGIE WHOSE PRIDE AND NATIONALISM COULD CAUSE HIM TO MAKE DECISION EVEN THOUGH ODDS SEEMED NOT TO BE IN HIS FAVOR. HOWEVER, WE ARE IN- CLINED DOUBT HE WOULD BE WILLING TAKE SUCH RISK UNLESS HE SUCCEEDS IN PLANS TO RALLY STRONGER POLITICAL SUPPORT THAN HE HAD OVER PAST TEN DAYS, AND UNLESS HE CAN EXPECT GREATER DEGREE OF NEUTRALIZATION SYRIAN FACTOR THAN WAS CASE OVER PAST TEN DAYS.

10. IN CONCLUSION, PRINCIPAL FACTORS WHICH PRESIDENT MUST CONSIDER IN CHARTING COURSE OF ACTION ARE (A) AVOIDANCE CONFESSIONAL SPLIT, (B) POSITIONOF SYRIA (AND EGYPT) AND (C) CAPACITY HIS SMALL ARMY. WITH THESE FACTS IN MIND, WE
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BELIEVE, UNLESS DISSIDENT FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS MANAGE FORCE
RESUMPTION FIGHTING AND THIS DISTINCT POSSIBILITY,
MOST LIKELY OUTCOME IS SOME SORT OF " LEBANESE SOLUTION"
WHICH WILL SAVE SOME FACE BUT WHICH NOT LIKELY FUNDAMENTALLY
CHANGE POSITION OF FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. IT WOULD SAVE LEBANON
FOR TIME BEING FROM POTENTIAL CATASTROPE BUT SEEDS OF
ANOTHER EXPLOSION WOULD REMAIN. THIS, OF COURSE, PREDICATED
ON ABSENCE ANY ISRAELI RAIDS ON LEBANON DURING CRISIS.
HOUGHTON

NOTE BY OC/ T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

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